Considerations Relating to the Inheritance Laws of the Kitab-i-Aqdas, Some

Abstract

This presentation will suggest some considerations which might be borne in mind when interpreting the inheritance laws. There has been much discussion about the equity, or lack of equity, concerning the way in which male and female heirs are treated in the Kitab-i-Aqdas: Linda and John Walbridge, for instance, inferred some sociological features of a Bahá'í society from its supposed inequalities.1 But reading the text itself I am not at all sure that we find the inequalities there. The inheritance laws of the Aqdas are written with the assumption that the deceased is a man. Thus Bahá'u'lláh explicitly says that the residence and personal clothing of the deceased go to the male, not female, offspring [K25]. 'Abdu'l-Bahá interpreted this as meaning that the residence and personal clothing of a deceased man remain in the male line [n44]. Shoghi Effendi says in the Synopsis [p. 155] that the residence and clothing of the deceased father pass to the male, not to the female, offspring. A lot of analysis has been made about the effects this law would have were it applied in a Bahá'í society, but the assumption appears to be that the pattern of property ownership in a Bahá'í society would be similar to that in Middle Eastern societies--in which the man or father is generally the absolute legal owner of the family home, if indeed it is owned. Why this pattern should be projected onto a Bahá'í society escapes me. Even Islamic law had formally permitted women to retain their earnings as their own property: "to men is allotted what they earn, and to women what they earn" [4:32]. In a society in which both boys and girls are educated in a trade or profession, and everyone is expected to work, it does not seem plausible that men would retain their present overwhelming preponderance of property ownership. Thus even if the civil law does not specify the joint ownership of marital property, one would expect that it would frequently happen that the wife would own a share of, or even all of, the family home. The question then arises: what happens when the deceased is a woman and owns a share of the family property? According to the notes to the Aqdas, though the law is formulated with the presumption that the deceased is a man, its provisions apply, mutatis mutandis [n38], when the deceased is a women. The mutatis mutandis principle ("changing what has to be changed") indicates a direction for interpretations but is hardly explicit: what has to be changed, and how? There is one explicit statement from Bahá'u'lláh [Q 37] that (despite the apparently clear text of the Aqdas [K25]), "the personal clothing of the mother should be divided in equal shares among the daughters." This is in contrast to the clothing of a man, which goes to the eldest son if he is still alive, and if not, goes not to the children of the eldest son but rather to the second son, and so forth [n44]. This seems clear enough. In the Questions and Answers, Bahá'u'lláh adds "the used clothing of the mother should be divided in equal shares among the daughters, but the remainder of her estate, including property, jewelry, and unused clothing, is to be distributed, in the manner revealed in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas, to all her heirs. If however, the deceased hath left no daughters, her estate in its entirety must be divided in the manner designated for men in the holy Text. " [Q 37] The "remaining property" can comprise all or part of the family home, and other property. To consider the family home first, what is "the manner revealed in the Aqdas" when the deceased is a woman? When the deceased is a man, the principle is that the principal residence passes to the eldest son. So when the deceased is a women, would the residence pass to the eldest daughter, or, following the example of the personal clothes, would it be equally divided amongst the daughters? If she should have no daughters at all, at least, it would clearly go to the sons [Q 37] and be distributed in the manner designated for men in the Holy Text - thus to the eldest son if he is still alive, then the second son [n44]. Perhaps there is no pressing need to take a position on this question. It is at any rate clear that Bahá'u'lláh has provided for a completely different kind of inheritance pattern than that which prevails in the East, or for that matter in the West. In a Western society at present, if one partner dies, the other generally becomes the sole owner of at least the personal residence, so that the children inherit it only when both parents have died. Under Bahá'u'lláh's inheritance pattern, if one partner dies--assuming joint ownership of the family home--The remaining partner becomes in effect a partner with the children, since the eldest son, or the daughters (collectively or eldest), inherit the portion of the home which was owned by the deceased partner. This makes the children a full part of the family, rather than the family having a core (man and woman) and a periphery (children). And such a pattern is appropriate to a society in which women are expected to learn and practice a trade or profession. Rather than assuming that a widow is helpless and needs a son to take care of her, as I read the law it is assuming that she is able to take care of herself. The significance of this may be primarily symbolic rather than economic. The family home is a symbol of the unity and continuity of the family, and this provision that the children inherit at the death of either parent means that the family home is not left half-tenanted, as it were: when a man dies the eldest son in some respects takes his place, and the male and female principles continue as joint guardians of the family hearth. When a woman dies, her daughter(s) take her place. Thus rather than indicating distinct roles for men and women, the inheritance law could be interpreted as emphasizing the need for the union and harmony of these two fundamental forces. The Walbridges argued that the Bahá'í laws of inheritance favor men over women in order to establish family responsibility as a male obligation, and so ordain a "mildly patrilinear family." Supposing one accepts the link between inheritance (specifically, inheritance of the family home and personal clothing) and how descent and identity is traced, this pattern of inheritance would actually point towards a bilinear society, consisting of two "tribes"--male and female. Inheritance and lineality are broadly dispersed every time the torch is passed from one generation to the next, but a certain primacy and privilege as regards the most symbolic possessions is reserved for the sons of a man and the daughters of a woman. Thus the Qur'ánic principle "to men is allotted what they earn, and to women what they earn" [Qur'án 4:32] is extended from generation to generation. 1. Linda. and John Walbridge, Baháíí Laws on the Status of Men," World Order 19:1 (Fall 1984/Winter 1984-85) 25-36.