Presented at Session #4
Inheritance Laws of the Kitab-i-Aqdas
DePoort, DePoort, Netherlands · November 4–6, 1994
Abstract
Laws encapsulate principles. In some cases they appear to conflict. Although the equality of men and women is among the major social principles of the Baháíí Faith, Bahá'u'lláh's legislation does not treat men and women identically in every respect. It would appear that the complex Bahá'í laws of inheritance in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas favor men over women. In cases of intestacy (when an individual dies without leaving a will), male heirs receive more of the estate than do female heirs. The eldest son receives the father's house and clothing as part of his inheritance, plus a share of the estate that is divided equally among all the children. A deceased son's inheritance from his parent is passed to his son's children, but that of a deceased daughter is divided among other heirs. Widows inherit relatively little of their husbands' estates (15%); a man's children, especially his eldest son, are the main beneficiaries. It has been argued this system of inheritance advocates a mildly patrilineal family where the continuity of the family is traced through the male line. The biological father retains social and economic responsibility for his children. Men bear primary responsibility for the family; widows, step-children and orphans are the responsibility of their male blood-relatives. Thus, it would seem that men are provided with economic incentives that tie them to the family.1 However, Baháíuílláh specifically states that every Bahá'í is obliged to leave a will (Aqdas, Q69), and nowhere does Bahá'u'lláh suggest or advise that the intestacy pattern should be used as a model for wills. Rather, the relativity of the inheritance laws is suggested by considering the intestate provisions for non-Baháíí inheritors.2 The Aqdas states that non-Baháíís do not inherit when a Baháíí dies intestate and the entire estate reverts to the House of Justice. A non-Baháíí wife, a non-Baháíí son, daughter, grandchild, teacher or any other non-Baháíí who would normally be beneficiaries from the will receives nothing. However, Shoghi Effendi, in a letter written on his behalf, has stated that, "it is always possible for a Baháíí to provide for his non-Baháíí wife, children or relatives by leaving a will. And it is only fair that he should do so."3 Therefore by stating that "it is only fair" for Bahá'ís to provide for non-Baháíí relatives in their wills, the Guardian indicates that the intestate provisions in the Aqdas are not normative. Furthermore the principle of justice is highlighted, Rather the laws apply to a specific situation that happens when a Baháíí dies without a will. This specific provision may also have been intended for a limited period of time. All Baháíís are required in the Bahá'í writings to write a will. We can assume that all Bahá'ís will fully observe these laws in the future through universal literacy and education, and the increasing awareness of Baháíí law in conjunction with the maturation of those institutions that would assist Baháíís in observing them. These and other factors would seem to indicate that the laws of intestacy may become irrelevant in the future. Why then do they exist at all? The Aqdas was revealed around 1873 by Bahá'u'lláh in response to the repeated requests of Iranian Bahá'ís as to how they should arrange their affairs.4 These early believers found themselves in the position of no longer being Bib(s or Muslims and, in many cases, being cast out of their families as a result but still being forced to live by Islamic laws for lack of an alternative. Under these conditions, when a believer died intestate, which would have been the normal situation, the surviving Baháíí family would have had to apply Islamic laws of inheritance or rarely Bábí law; no secular civil laws existed. The need for a Baháíí law to address this temporary situation was both extreme and immediate. The laws of inheritance in the Aqdas may have been revealed to fill this demand. Presumably, in the context of early believers, the intestate provisions for non-Baháíí relatives apply to the situation where a newly converted Baháíí was thrown out of his or her family for leaving their family's traditional religion of Islam. Then it would not necessarily be unfair if these relatives were not included in the estate. There are other parts of the Aqdas that can also be seen to be relative to specific contexts. For example, Mírzá Yahyá is addressed at one point (K184); there are prophecies about Khurisin and Kirmán (K94, K164); the Bábí laws on the destruction of books, the prohibition of marriage of non-believers, the restriction on travel, and the prohibition of questioning the Founder of the Faith are all abrogated in the Aqdas (K77, K 139, K 13 1, K 126). Significantly Bahá'u'lláh enjoins the believers to recite an obligatory prayer in the Aqdas which he later changed (n9).5 The latter is an example of the specifics of an Aqdas law that was temporary; however, the injunction to obligatory prayer remains. This line of thinking would suggest that the laws of inheritance were given to address a specific and temporary need of believers living in Muslim countries at the end of the nineteenth century. It would therefore be unusual if the laws did not take into account the patrilineal patterns of those societies. But Bahá'u'lláh seems deliberately and specifically to have added provisions to this law that would lead to its abandonment. To some extent, it is analogous to the marriage law in the Aqdas which appears to permit bigamy. However, as bigamy is conditional on justice, it is not permissible: "The fact that bigamy has been made dependent upon an impossible condition is clear proof of its absolute prohibition.6 In the case of the inheritance laws, outside of their immediate historical context, they also depend on an unlikely condition that a Bahá'í would not write a will in his or her lifetime. Shoghi Effendi writes that every "Baháíí is permitted in his will to dispose of his wealth in the way he wishes" taking into account moral and spiritual principles.7 As for marriage, the principle of justice is pre-eminent among these. Laws encapsulate principles. The marriage law encapsulates an inviolable spiritual principle. Bahá'í inheritance laws should also reflect the principles of fairness and justice. In order to do so, the inheritance laws in the Aqdas for intestacy must be seen in their appropriate historical context.8 Linda and John Walbridge, "Bahá'í Laws on the Status of Men," World Order 19.1/2 (Fall 1984/Winter 1984-85): 25-36. This concept of the relativity of the inheritance laws of the Aqdas is adapted and developed from Anthony Lee's response to the Walbridgeís paper which was published in "A Question of Gender," Dialogue (Summer/Fall 1987): 32-34. Shoghi Effendi. Dawn of a New Day. (New Delhi: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1970) 77. Bahá'u'lláh, in Synopsis and Codification of the Laws and Ordinances of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas (Haifa: Baháíí World Center, 1973) 3. I am grateful to Juan Cole for bringing this case to my attention. 'Abdu'l-Bahá, qtd. in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas (Haifa: Bahá'í World Center, 1993) 206. Shoghi Effendi, qtd. in the Aqdas, 182 A longer version of this essay appears as a Sounding in The Baháíí Studies Review, 4.1.1994.
Full Text
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Also at Session #4